

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

* * *

ERIC HAFNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH M. LOMBARDO, Nevada Governor,
AARON FORD, Nevada Attorney General,
FRANCISCO V. AGUILAR, Nevada Secretary
of State,

Defendants.

Case No: 2:23-cv-02141-CDS-EJY

**ORDER
AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Re: ECF No. 2-1**

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Eric Hafner's Application to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* ("IFP") and Complaint. ECF No. 2 and 2-1.

I. In Forma Pauperis Application

Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP is complete under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and shows an inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application is granted.

II. Screening the Complaint

Upon granting a request to proceed *in forma pauperis*, a court must screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Watson v. Carter*, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

1 would entitle him to relief.” *Nordstrom v. Ryan*, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Iqbal*,
2 556 U.S. at 678).

3 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material
4 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Wylar Summit P’ship*
5 *v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc.*, 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the
6 standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide
7 more than mere labels and conclusions. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
8 A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. *Id.* Unless it is clear the
9 complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a *pro se* plaintiff should be given
10 leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. *Cato v. United*
11 *States*, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

12 **III. Finding Regarding Plaintiff’s Complaint**

13 Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks an Order from the Court requiring the State of Nevada
14 (sometimes the “State”) to place him on the ballot as a candidate for the State’s First U.S.
15 Congressional District. Plaintiff sues the Governor (Joseph Lombardo), the State Attorney General
16 (Aaron Ford), and the Secretary of State (Francisco V. Aguilar). Plaintiff cites Nevada Revised
17 Statute (“NRS”) 293.177 claiming it unconstitutionally prevents him from running for office because
18 the statute requires that a person seeking to be placed on the ballot must file a signed and notarized
19 Declaration of Candidacy, have a valid government issued photo ID, not be a convicted felon or
20 have had his civil rights restored, and pay the \$300 filing fee (applicable to a Congressional
21 Representative filing no earlier than “the first Monday in January of the year in which the election is
22 to be held and not later than 5 p.m. on the second Friday after the first Monday in January.” NRS
23 293.177; NRS 293.193; ECF No. 2-1 at 8. Plaintiff does not allege he has filed a declaration of
24 candidacy, attempted to do so, or that an application to do so was rejected.

25 The Court notes that a review of NRS 293.177, which includes the form of declaration
26 required before a person will be placed on a ballot and the statute generally, does require each of the
27 items Plaintiff complains about, but does not seem to include an express requirement that the person
28 filing the Declaration of Candidacy appear in person; although, the Statute does state “the candidate

1 shall present to the filing officer” a valid driver’s license or government issued identification card.
 2 NRS 293.177.3(b)(1). The Statute also makes clear that the candidate’s address in the State of
 3 Nevada must be one where the candidate has resided for at least 30 days “immediately preceding
 4 the date of the close of filing of declarations of candidacy for this office”; the candidate is a “qualified
 5 elector pursuant to Section 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution of the State of Nevada”; and the
 6 candidate has either never been convicted of treason or a felony or, if he has, his “civil rights have
 7 been restored.” *Id.*

8 Various cases around the country have reviewed state election laws and concluded that the
 9 states have significant authority to regulate the formation of political parties and the identification
 10 of candidates on the ballot. *McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections*, 65 F.3d 1215 (4th
 11 Cir.1995) (upholding as constitutional North Carolina’s requirement that a candidate of a new
 12 political party gather signatures of two percent of voters statewide, with at least 200 signatures from
 13 registered voters residing in each of four congressional districts, and then requiring the new party
 14 candidate to poll at least ten percent of votes in the general election for that party to remain on the
 15 ballot).

16 Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the
 17 States on candidates’ eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally-suspect
 18 burdens on voters’ rights to associate or to choose among candidates. We have
 19 recognized that, “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of
 20 elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos,
 21 is to accompany the democratic processes.” *Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 730 ...
 22 (1974). To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive
 and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether
 it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility
 of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some
 degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for
 political ends. Nevertheless, the state’s important regulatory interests are generally
 sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.

23 *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). To decide whether a ballot-access law violates
 24 these rights, the Court held, the judiciary must identify the “character and magnitude” of the harm
 25 to the rights and compare that harm to the “precise interests” that the state used to justify the law.
 26 *Id.* at 789.

27 In contrast to the above, case law establishes that “states may not require U.S. House of
 28 Representative candidates to submit to any qualifications that are not listed in Article I, Section 2,

1 Clause 2 or in Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” *Sharma v. Circosta*, Case No. 5:22-CV-
 2 59-BO, 2022 WL 19835738, at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 16, 2022), *motion for relief from judgment denied*,
 3 Case No. 5:22-CV-59-BO, 2023 WL 3437808 (E.D.N.C. May 11, 2023), *cert. denied before*
 4 *judgment*, Case No. 23-5011, 2023 WL 6379035 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023). Those qualifications include
 5 that members of the House of Representatives must (1) be at least twenty-five years of age, (2) have
 6 been a United States citizen for at least seven years, and (3) be an inhabitant of the state they
 7 represent. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

8 Here, despite the limitations on running for office created by NRS 293.177, some of which
 9 may be inconsistent with Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,¹ Plaintiff
 10 offers nothing to the Court showing he is a resident of the State of Nevada.² Thus, Plaintiff asks the
 11 Court to rule on the constitutionality of Nevada’s election laws when he has not demonstrated he
 12 meets all of the qualifications required by the U.S. Constitution applicable to running for Congress
 13 in Nevada. Therefore, Plaintiff does not establish he has standing to bring his claim. “The doctrine
 14 of standing is rooted in the ‘Cases or Controversies’ clause of Article III of the Constitution.” *M.S.*
 15 *v. Brown*, 902 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2018). “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate
 16 a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” *Id.* at 1083 (internal citation and quote marks
 17 omitted). Courts enforce this requirement by insisting that a plaintiff satisfy the familiar three-part
 18 test for Article III standing: that the plaintiff “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
 19 to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
 20 judicial decision.” *Id.* (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff has not established an injury in fact and
 21 thus cannot establish standing. When this is coupled with the fact that Plaintiff does not demonstrate

22 ¹ See *Joyner v. Mofford*, 706 F.2d 1523, 1529 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing numerous cases holding various state
 23 law restricting eligibility for federal office candidacy unconstitutional); *Dillon v. Fiorina*, 340 F.Supp. 729 (D.N.M.
 24 1972) (requiring candidates must be registered with political party for at least one year prior to filing date to be eligible
 25 to run in party primary); *Exon v. Tiemann*, 279 F.Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1968) (requiring candidate for House of
 26 Representatives reside in the congressional district in which they are nominated); *Hellmann v. Collier*, 141 A.2d 908
 (1958) (same); *Shub v. Simpson*, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (Md.App.1950) (demanding candidates file anti-subversion
 declaration to be eligible for office); *Danielson v. Fitzsimmons*, 44 N.W.2d 484 (1950) (convicted felon cannot qualify
 for federal office); *In Re O’Connor*, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1940) (communist felon not allowed to file for election to
 Congress).

27 ² While there is a rebuttable presumption that a prisoner is a resident of the state where he lived and intended to
 28 stay before his incarceration, even if he is currently incarcerated elsewhere (see *Hall v. Curran*, 599 F.3d 70, 72 (1st
 Cir.2010)), case law holds that residency requirements are constitutional when governmental interests are established.
Oswald v. Ireland-Imhof, 599 F.Supp.3d 211 (D.N.J. 2022).

1 he has sought to be placed on the ballot or that he submitted a declaration attempting to be placed
 2 on the ballot and was rejected, Plaintiff has not presented a claim ripe for judicial resolution. A
 3 matter is only ripe “when the action in controversy is final and not dependent on future
 4 uncertainties.” *Miller v. Brown*, 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff claim is not final, and
 5 it depends on future uncertainties. The Nevada Board of Elections has not acted upon any notice of
 6 candidacy filed by Plaintiff. Thus, there is no adverse agency action for the Court to review. As a
 7 result, the issue is not fit for judicial decision.

8 **IV. Order**

9 Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to
 10 Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

11 **V. Recommendation**

12 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 2-1) be dismissed
 13 without prejudice.

14 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be allowed to refile his claim once he
 15 establishes standing to do so and that his claim is ripe.

16 DATED this 3rd day of January, 2024.

17
 18 
 19 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAK
 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

20 **NOTICE**

21 Pursuant to Local Rule IB 3-2, any objection to this Finding and Recommendation must be
 22 in writing and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days. In 1985, the Supreme
 23 Court held that the courts of appeal may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure
 24 to file objections within the specified time. *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985). The Ninth
 25 Circuit has also held that (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and (2) failure to
 26 properly address and brief the objectionable issues waives the right to appeal the District Court’s
 27 order and/or appeal factual issues from the order of the District Court. *Martinez v. Ylst*, 951 F.2d
 28 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991); *Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist.*, 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983).